Source: Wikipedia


The Memoirs of General William T. Sherman
Volumes I & II
by William Tecumseh Sherman
Volume I: 436 pages
Volume II 310 pages
Public Domain Books, 2004

Digging through the “Available for free download” pages at Amazon, I found this interesting item. I was to be at sea for a while, with little to do during off time. I wasn’t sure what I was in for and didn’t expect what I found.

Sherman began his work with a brief background. From his family history to his early days in the Army, his delivery is so prosaic that it is easy to forget the presence of some stories that should have been interesting. From the tail end of his Army career on, however, Sherman’s fortunes got downright boring. He even managed to downplay his direct involvement in such things as the original California gold strikes and armed near-insurrections in the gold-crazed Bay Area. As boring as I consider the business of banking, Sherman manages to lower my expectations.

Thankfully, any reader of this book is likely to have a very different interest: the Civil War.

When Sherman begins this part of the book, the tone of the work changes. Rather than simple narrative, he begins to rely more and more on reproductions of original letters, orders, and articles. The difficulty of this is that the reader does not get impressions of the importance of some of the individual actions. In places, a battle of relatively little significance overall is given as much attention as something monumental. In a way, though, this is refreshing. Absent exhaustive analysis ex post facto, we get a better feel for how things must have been in the eyes of the participants. Strangely, we see that Sherman’s abilities with the written word are found more in his official documents than in his narrative prose.

I didn’t begin to really note interesting passages until the second volume (with one exception, but I will address that by itself at a later time). This is from a letter to a delegation representing the city of Atlanta:

You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace.

Letters from his colleagues also begin to show the change in martial philosophy late in the war. General Halleck was a bit more direct in addressing the possibilities should Sherman enter Charleston:

Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident the place may be destroyed, and, if a little salt should be sown upon its site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession.

Sherman responds:

I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy’s country, because this war differs from European wars in this particular: we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies.

I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and do not think “salt” will be necessary.

Sherman explains to others that economic interests should be addressed in negative terms. That is to say that the Army and civilian authorities must be careful not to start up the economies of subjugated areas to vigorously, as the spoils may make their way to Lee’s army.

On one occasion, Sherman was to witness an interview of some black camp followers. I though their representative’s response to one question interesting:

Fourth Question. State in what manner you would rather live — whether scattered among the whites, or in colonies by yourselves?

Answer. I would prefer to live by ourselves, for there is a prejudice against us in the South that will take years to get over; …”

On his dealings with President Abraham Lincoln:

Of all the men I ever met, he seemed to possess more of the elements of greatness, combined with goodness, than any other.

As the war draws to a close, Sherman begins to detail military lessons of the war. These, it turns out, continue to be applicable. I will leave those for a separate discussion.

Finally, Sherman details the conflicts between himself and the Fourth Estate throughout the book. Near the end, the conflicts seem to center on President Johnson, Secretary of War Stanton, General (and, later, President) Grant, and himself. I am not generally interested in these sorts of intrigues, but they are of historical significance to those wishing to understand the Civil War and the state of the post-war military and government. Indeed, this is an important work for that purpose. But I find the most important insights in two areas which, as I’ve said, I will address separately. I have long felt that Sherman’s contribution to the war was underrated, but now I see that even his philosophy seems to have been necessary to complete the subjugation of the Confederacy.